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 An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain
 Patricia Munch
 RAND Corporation
 A theoretical analysis of land assembly with and without eminent domain
 concludes that, contrary to traditional assumptions, eminent domain is
 not necessarily a more efficient institution than the free market for con-
 solidating many contiguous but separately owned parcels into a single
 ownership unit. In practice, prices paid under eminent domain may
 differ systematically from the "fair market value" standard, depending
 on court costs of buyer and seller. Evidence from urban renewal supports
 the hypothesis that, due to the structure of court costs, high-valued
 properties receive more than market value and low-valued properties
 receive less than market value.
 Introduction
 Eminent domain (ED) is the legal right to acquire property by forced
 rather than by voluntary exchange. When a buyer seeking to acquire a
 property has the power of ED, he must attempt to negotiate a voluntary
 sale. But if his highest offer is rejected, he may condemn the property,
 that is, obtain a forced sale at a price determined in a court of law.
 In the United States, the use of ED is constrained by constitutional
 provisions at the federal and state level which typically require that
 private property only be taken for "public use" and only after payment
 of "just compensation."' Enforcement of these constitutional provisions
 is divided between the legislatures and the judiciary. Legislatures-
 federal and state have the right to grant ED power. They typically
 I would like to thank the members of my thesis committee, Professors George J. Stigler,
 Gary S. Becker, and Ronald H. Coase, for their guidance and valuable insights. I also
 benefited from the comments of an anonymous referee.
 ' Generalizations on the legal aspects of ED are based on Lewis (1909) and Nichols
 (1970).
 [Journal of Political Economy, 1976, vol. 84, no. 3]
 ) 1976 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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 grant it to a particular body or for a specific project, leaving to the
 discretion of the grantee the decision as to which parcels of land to acquire
 and whether or not to exercise its latent power of condemnation. The
 main role of the judiciary is to determine "just compensation," not to
 review the legitimacy of the taking of a particular parcel.2 Thus, ED is
 effectively a reassignment of property rights: the seller is deprived of his
 right to refuse to sell and constrained in his right to bargain over price.
 However, because of the just-compensation provision, the curtailment of
 private property rights implied by ED is less than that inherent in the
 taxing and regulatory powers of government. In fact, ED may be
 interpreted as a limitation on the police power of the state against private
 property in real estate (Scheiber 1971).
 The growth in the use of ED over time suggests, if the survivorship
 principle may be applied to institutions, that ED reduces some component
 of costs to at least one party. There are two, not mutually exclusive,
 possibilities: (1) ED reduces total costs, permitting a net gain in efficiency,
 and (2) ED redistributes costs and therefore wealth.
 If ED were a simple transfer of well-defined property rights, and if
 transactions costs under both property-right assignments were zero and
 wealth effects symmetrical, no change in resource allocation would be
 implied, according to the Coase theorem (Coase 1960). 3 But in the
 sparse references to ED in the economic literature, 4 the converse is
 assumed without rigorous justification, at least with respect to use of ED
 for assembly. Consolidation of many contiguous but separately owned
 parcels of land under one owner supposedly creates a holdout problem,
 with each seller having an incentive to hold out to be the last to settle
 and capture any rent accruing to the assembly. Because of either monopoly
 prices of sellers or high transactions costs or both (since the buyer can
 trade off between the two), the free market results in a suboptimal amount
 of assembly being undertaken. The next step in the argument, although
 not in logic, is that ED improves the situation.
 A crude examination of the circumstances in which ED is actually used
 does not leave the impression that their outstanding common charac-
 teristic is consolidation of ownership rights, which is nowhere mentioned
 as a necessary condition of the granting of ED power. In practice, almost
 all departments of federal, state, and local government, many regulated
 industries, and government-related educational and medical establish-
 ments have some form of ED power in most states, regardless of whether
 2 To contest the taking, as opposed to the prices paid, the condemned must prove that
 the condemnor has used his power "unconstitutionally," "fraudulently," or "abusively."
 The courts may, however, review the original grant of ED on the grounds that it is not
 for a legitimate public use.
 3 "Transaction costs" here include court costs. It is questionable whether the first
 precondition of the Coase theorem, exclusively assigned property rights, is met in most
 ED contexts, since the condemnor is usually a government-associated agency.
 4 E.g., Arrow (1970), Colean (1970), and McCloskey (1972).
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 they wish to acquire one parcel for a schoolhouse or campaign head-
 quarters or 1,000 miles of right-of-way for a freeway. The outstanding
 characteristic of situations where ED is used is land acquisition by a
 government-related body, not consolidation of ownership rights.5 The
 two sets, although far from mutually exclusive, are not perfectly over-
 lapping. Notable examples of industries in the United States which must
 assemble property, do serve the public, but have not themselves been
 granted ED are agriculture, private manufacturing, and suburban
 development. 6
 However, since the economic efficiency argument for ED rests on its
 comparative advantage over the free market in assembling separately
 owned parcels into a single ownership unit, this is the focus of the present
 study. A necessary condition for ED to be an efficient institution is that
 the welfare costs, due to deviations between price paid under ED and the
 value of a parcel in its best alternative use, plus resource costs of
 transacting, be less than under alternative property right assignments.
 After a brief theoretical comparison of the relative efficiencies of ED and
 the free market, a model of price determination under ED is described
 and then tested with data from urban renewal in Chicago. A comparable
 set of data from free-market assemblies was unobtainable. However,
 theoretical considerations and the limited evidence available offer no
 support for the asserted efficiency of ED.
 Theoretical Comparison of ED with Assembly in the
 Free Market
 Consider an area where there are many homogeneous properties.
 Assuming the market functions efficiently in transferring properties to
 their highest-valued uses, subject to imperfect information and positive
 5A distinction should perhaps be made here between grants of ED for which govern-
 ment relatedness seems to be a necessary condition and actual exercise of the latent power
 by use or threat of use of condemnation proceedings. It is possible that ED is more
 frequently exercised by bodies which have the latent power when assembly of many
 parcels is involved. I know of no body of data to test this hypothesis. Two pieces of crude
 evidence tend to support the presumption that ED is most valuable in an assembly
 context: (1) Although most government-related bodies now have the power, the earliest
 to acquire it were those engaged in assembly, e.g., gristmills, canals, roads, and railroads.
 (2) In terms of area taken, the most extensive current uses are for highways, urban re-
 newal, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, all of which typically involve assembly
 (U.S. Congress 1965).
 6 These industries, however, have presumably benefited from particular uses of ED:
 e.g., agriculture, from the use of ED for drainage, gristmills, and railroads; and private
 manufacturing, from the use of ED for highways. Similarly, although only those urban
 renewal projects sponsored by a public agency are entitled to use ED, it might be more
 correct to identify the "user" of ED as the private real estate industry, to which land
 acquired under ED by the urban renewal authorities is ultimately sold at less than the
 acquisition cost. In other words, some public agencies may be, more or less, fronts created
 by private industries to accommodate the constitutional "public use" requirement. Thus,
 it may be misleading to identify ED with government-related agencies.
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 search costs, the atomistic market reservation prices7 of current owners
 will form a distribution skewed to the right. Transactions will take place
 within a range around a mean market value, which will be below the
 modal value of the distribution. Then, for purchases of randomly scattered
 parcels with an average amount of search per parcel, the supply curve is
 infinitely elastic at a price equal to mean market value. The supply curve
 of contiguous properties to any buyer, however, is an increasing function
 of the number of parcels to be purchased in a given period, because of
 the rising probability of encountering owners not at the selling margin
 whose reservation price exceeds mean market value of the property. 8 The
 supply curve of parcels for assembly is steeper the greater the dispersion
 of atomistic reservation prices of current owners in the market.
 Figure 1 represents supply and demand conditions of a typical buyer
 for parcels for one type of project within the universe of projects requiring
 assembly, for example, urban renewal or highways. MCm is the supply
 curve of randomly scattered parcels, and MCa is the supply curve of
 contiguous properties. Both reflect atomistic reservation prices and social
 opportunity costs. The slower the rate of acquisition, the flatter MCa,
 approaching MCm in the limit. The demand curve is the marginal value
 product curve per parcel of a given size, as part of an assembly, for a
 given rate of acquisition and set of initial conditions with respect to
 number of buyers in the industry. The slower the rate of acquisition, the
 lower the demand curve. 9
 If the buyer cannot discriminate between sellers (because reservation
 prices are not freely observable), and so expects to pay all n sellers the
 reservation price of the nth, MCa is the buyer's average cost curve. Profit
 7 "Atomistic market reservation price" is defined as the reservation price of a seller to
 a buyer whom he did not suspect of planning an assembly.
 8 Assume that assembly involves drawing a sample of size n from the distribution of
 atomistic reservation prices. Let Y1 denote the ith order statistic of this sample, i.e.,
 Y1 < Y2 < ... < Y,,. The height of the MCa curve, the supply curve of contiguous
 parcels, at n parcels is the expected value of the nth-order statistic from a sample of size n.
 For any point i between the origin and the point n, the height of MCa measures the
 expected value of Yi. Strictly, there is a different MCa curve for each sample size. The
 precise shape of the curve is not important. It is sufficient to establish that it is upward
 sloping. This follows from the fact that for many density functions, e.g., normal, gamma,
 and exponential, the expected value of the nth order statistic has the following form:
 E(Y.) = 0 + fI(n)u,
 where 0 = mean of underlying distribution, a = standard deviation of underlying
 distribution, and fi(n) > 0, fi' > 0, fi" < 0. The exact form of fi(n) depends on the
 specific distribution.
 9 If the project has some minimum feasible size, the demand curve will be discon-
 tinuous at the corresponding number of parcels. If assembly of dispersed ownerships into
 one unit permits the internalization of externalities, there may be increasing returns to
 scale, implying an upward-sloping demand schedule over an initial range. The shape of
 the demand curve may affect the conclusion but not the method of analysis of the re-
 spective welfare costs of the free market and ED.
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 MCb
 _M Cm
 ________ # parcels
 Qa Qc Qed per project
 FIG. 1.-Welfare costs of assembly with and without eminent domain
 maximization implies Qa parcels will be bought. A resource misallocation
 cost equal to the triangle W is implied. Rents accrue to the buyer and
 to intramarginal sellers.
 In the absence of barriers to entry by other buyers and sellers on
 alternative sites, these quasi-monopsonist and scarce-factor rents cannot
 persist in the long run. Competition among buyers, attempting to capture
 the rent which accrues to intramarginal sellers in the absence of discrim-
 ination, will lead to the development of techniques to discover true seller
 reservation prices. This is facilitated by competition among sellers on
 alternative sites. The incentive to conceal atomistic reservation price
 exists only if substitutes are not available at competitive prices.
 With competition on both sides of the market, seller reservation prices
 to an assembler will be no different from atomistic reservation prices.
 This implies that MCa is the effective marginal cost curve. The profit-
 maximizing number of parcels per project is Qc. This is consistent with
 the criteria of social optimality, although it is less than Qed at the
 intersection of the MVP curve with the market supply curve of isolated
 parcels, because the social opportunity cost of contiguous properties
 exceeds the social opportunity cost of the same number of randomly
 scattered properties.
 In the absence of perfect substitutes for a particular site, a rent exists
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 that is potentially capturable by the owners of land. However, a holdout
 problem, as distinct from a monopoly problem, is implied only if the
 rights to the rent are not exclusively assigned. For example, if uniqueness
 is obviously specific to a particular parcel, the rent will accrue to its
 owner, and there is no reason for the owners of other inputs to raise
 reservation prices above atomistic market level. In general, there may be
 less than perfect substitutes for many or all parcels in a group, that is, for
 the ith of n parcels in a group, A, there exist alternative parcels which
 may be substituted for it at a cost to the assembler xi percent higher,
 where xi may vary across the n parcels. If each seller in set A anticipates
 that sellers of the alternative parcels will settle at their atomistic
 reservation prices and that other sellers in set A will settle for not less than
 their share of the rent as defined by substitution possibilities, prices and
 shares of the rent are determinate. Assembly is characterized by monopoly
 prices (or rents to superior factors), but it is misleading to speak of a
 holdout rather than a monopoly problem, since changing the unit of
 ownership is immaterial.
 A distinct holdout problem, specific to assembly, arises only if at least
 one seller anticipates that others will settle for less than their "share" of
 the rent and therefore tries to capture more than his "share," up to a
 maximum for any one seller of the entire rent net of competitive prices
 for other inputs. Moreover, the existence of a potential rent, due to lack
 of perfect substitutes, may occur in assembly even though there are
 physically equivalent sites for a particular project. For competition to be
 effective, substitutes must be available at competitive prices throughout
 the negotiation process. But assembling many ownerships is typically a
 sequential process, because transacting is time consuming. When some
 parcels on site A have already been acquired, in negotiations for the
 outstanding parcels, site B, assumed physically equivalent, is a less than
 perfect substitute unless the expected cost of B gross of transactions costs
 is no greater than the expected cost of the remainder of A gross of
 transactions costs plus the resale value of parcels already acquired on A
 net of transactions cost. Thus, the costs of negotiating many contracts and
 of uncertainty as to prices, rather than physical availability, may limit the
 operation of competitive forces in an assembly context. The implied
 potential rent to outstanding parcels on a particular site when some have
 already been acquired creates an incentive to hold out.1o
 In conclusion, a problem which is specific to the assembly of several
 ownerships into a single unit arises as a combination of a monopoly and
 free-rider problem. If a particular site is physically unique, rents will
 accrue to current owners as to any scarce factors. Even in the absence of
 10 The options contract is a method of maintaining competitive pressures throughout
 the negotiation process.
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 physical uniqueness, assembly may create a potential rent to the last
 parcels to settle, due to transactions costs and uncertainty as to prices of
 alternatives. Even if property rights are sufficiently well defined for the
 market to function efficiently when changing the unit of ownership is not
 in question, the rights to any rents generated by changing the unit of
 ownership may not be well assigned, since reservation prices are not
 freely observable and there may be uncertainty as to prices charged by
 other sellers. This creates a type of free-rider problem, each party having
 an incentive to try to capture more than his atomistic reservation price
 for his input, on the assumption of asymmetrical behavior by other
 parties.
 Where rents are attributable to physical uniqueness, they are no
 different from rents to scarce factors. No resource misallocation is implied,
 but assembly may entail a welfare cost not generally associated with
 scarce factors if the rent is dissipated in bargaining over its distribution.
 However, where potential rents are attributable solely to the transactions
 costs of maintaining competitive pressures, assembly entails resource
 misallocation and welfare costs similar to those implied by the monopsony
 solution in figure 1. If holdout behavior is anticipated, MCa, reflecting
 atomistic reservation prices, is no longer the relevant marginal cost
 curve. Expenditure on devices to circumvent or eliminate the incentive
 to hold out will be incurred. Such devices include concealment of the
 identity of the buyer, the purpose and extent of the planned assembly and
 prices paid for parcels, and the use of brokers and special contractual
 forms, such as options or uniform price contracts. The optimal level of
 such expenditure defines a new MC curve, lying above MCa but not
 necessarily equal to MCb, and a new free-market level of output and
 welfare cost, which may exceed or fall short of W in figure 1. " The
 expenditure on transactions to avoid the holdout problem represents an
 additional waste due to assembly, if efficiency is defined relative to the
 zero transactions cost situation.
 If the free market tends to produce suboptimal-sized assemblies, the
 ED "just compensation" standard may have the opposite effect. Just
 compensation is defined as "fair market value" exclusive of the value to
 this particular seller. If enforced, this implies prices equal to MCm in
 figure 1. If the demand curve is assumed unchanged, optimal output, at
 Qed, is excessive. Fixing the price at the market average understates the
 social opportunity cost. The welfare cost, given by the triangle B, may
 be less than or exceed W.
 Note that the welfare costs of ED are likely to be high in precisely those
 circumstances in which the market is inefficient, that is, where seller
 I I The various devices developed in the free market to circumvent the holdout problem
 are discussed in Munch (1973).
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 reservation prices are dispersed, implying an inelastic social opportunity
 cost curve, MCa, and high transactions costs of discriminating between
 sellers. A similar symmetry exists in the absence of transactions costs. In
 the free market, the buyer would discriminate along the MCa curve.
 Under ED, if the expected court award, MCm, were less than MCa, the
 value of the parcel to the seller, he would offer the buyer the difference
 to prevent the taking of the parcel. Then MCa would be the effective
 marginal cost curve to the buyer, and the profit-maximizing output level
 would also be socially optimal. Thus, with zero transactions costs, both
 the free market and the ED assignments of property rights yield an
 optimal result. Since transacting under both regimes is not costless, the
 efficiency conclusion on ED relative to the market is theoretically
 ambiguous, even if fair market value is paid.
 Price Determination under ED
 Constitutional dictates notwithstanding, since fair market value is not a
 freely observable datum, both buyer and seller will invest in searching for
 the most favorable price, and the outcome may differ systematically from
 fair market value, depending on the costs of and returns to search for the
 two parties. For both, the optimum search strategy implies setting a
 reservation price for settlement out of court which maximizes expected
 wealth, net of transactions costs, over the two alternatives, settlement in
 or out of court.
 Price determination under ED may be formulated by the following
 reduced-form model:
 Sb = b()
 Ss = S (2)
 cb = Cb(Pm), (3)
 Cs = E[k(PC - P)] (4)
 Pc = Pm - hb(Cb) + hs(Cs) + v; v [0, ru(Pm)], (5)
 E(PC) = PC + W; W [0' [0, 2(Pm)], (6)
 E(PC)S = PC + Z; Z [0, &2(Pm)], (7)
 pmax = E(Pc)b + (Cb - Sb), (8)
 pa = E(P )s - (CS - Ss), (9)
 max pmin = (P b (+ Cb + C S _ S > 0, 10)
 P = j(prnax + pmin) (11)
 =[E(PC)b + E(PC) ] + I4[(Cb - Sb) - (CS - SS)]
 =PC + <[ACb - ACs], (11')
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 where Sb = buyer's costs of out-of-court settlement, Cb = buyer's court
 costs, S' = seller's costs of out-of-court settlement, CS = seller's court
 costs, ACb = Cb -Sb, ACS = Cs - Ss, PC = price awarded in court,
 E(Pc)b = buyer's expectation of court award, E(Pc)5 = seller's expecta-
 tion of court award, Pm = market value, Pax = buyer's maximum
 offer in out-of-court negotiations, pmin = seller's minimum ask price in
 out-of-court negotiations, P, = price determined voluntarily in out-of-
 court settlement, and v, w, z = stochastic error terms. All variables are
 measured relative to market value.
 Equations (1) and (2) state that settlement costs are a constant
 proportion of market value. Equation (3) makes buyer court costs a
 variable function of market value. Equation (4) states that seller court
 costs are the expected value of the attorney's fee, which, in a contingent
 fee contract typically used in ED cases, is some fraction of the difference
 between the court award and the buyer's final offer.
 Equation (5) describes the determination of price in court. Any
 systematic deviation of court award from market value is the result of
 expenditure by both parties on court inputs and the function hb( ) and
 hS( ), which relate this expenditure to influence on court verdict.
 Equations (6) and (7) state that both parties have unbiased expectations
 of court award, with random errors having zero mean and variance a
 function of parcel value. The assumption that expectations are unbiased
 is plausible if both hire legal counsel with experience in the field of
 condemnation.
 Equations (8) and (9) state the upper and lower bounds, respectively,
 on offer and ask prices consistent with wealth maximization.12 Equation
 (10) is a necessary condition for settlement out of court, that is, pmax >
 Painf. Rearranging terms produces
 (Cb - sb) + (Cs - SS) ? E(Pc)s - E(Pc)b z - w.
 Thus, settlement out of court requires that the sum of the incremental
 costs due to going to court exceed the difference between the seller's and
 buyer's expectations of court award. Note that this is independent of the
 assignment of liability for court costs.
 Equation (11) describes the determination of price in an out-of-court
 settlement. It makes the simplest assumption that the parties split the
 difference between PO ax and Pamin. The subsequent analysis applies if I is
 replaced by any positive fraction, to reflect "unequal bargaining power,"
 and the A in equation (11') omitted, since settlement costs are assumed
 to be an invariant fraction of market value.
 12 Actual final offers and asks may lie within these bounds, depending on each party's
 assessment of the probability of going to court.
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 The Alternative Hypotheses
 Given this model, one set of sufficient conditions for prices .aid under ED
 to approximate market value with random errors is the following: (i)
 Anticipation of ED does not affect market value prior to the filing of the
 petition to condemn. It is fair market value as of the date of filing the
 petition to condemn that the courts are instructed to award. The timing
 of filing is at the discretion of the condemnor. (ii) Cb(Pm) =- 3s(Pm) that
 is, buyer and seller court costs bear the same functional relate . to market
 value. (iii) Sb = Ss. (iv) hb( ) = h5( ), that is, the returns to court
 expenditure are the same for buyer and seller.
 These conditions yield the null hypothesis that prices paid under ED
 approximate market value with random errors, regardless of whether the
 price is negotiated voluntarily or awarded in court. An alternative
 hypothesis may be generated by incorporating into the model the
 following assumptions based on economic theory or empirical evidence
 from urban renewal in Chicago: (i') Anticipation of ED tends to depress
 market value. ED implies a loss of use rights associated with the property,
 in particular, effective loss of the right to refuse to sell and greater
 uncertainty of lease duration, since condemnors have special rights to
 terminate leases. Thus, anticipation of ED would tend to depress market
 value, ceteris paribus.' 3 (ii') Cb(Pm) : CS(Pm), that is, optimum expendi-
 tures on court costs are not the same for buyer and seller.
 Optimum expenditure on court costs depends on the costs of and
 returns to hiring legal "inputs" and constraints on choice of quality and
 quantity. The buyer in condemnation cases is typically constrained by
 statutory requirements on the use of legal personnel. Thus, the Depart-
 ment of Urban Renewal in Chicago is represented in all court cases by
 the City of Chicago's corporation counsel and is required to obtain at
 least two independent appraisals in each case. The seller, on the other
 13 If at time to, condemnation is anticipated at some future date, to, the present value
 of the property at to is
 (I + r)n r
 where E (Ptn) = expected price obtainable at t, under ED and R = value of service
 stream derived from property from to to t,. Uncertainty as to the value placed by the
 courts on maintenance expenditure may reduce the optimum maintenance program and
 reduce R; if the property is rented, this will be exacerbated by a reduction in the demand
 for leases because of uncertainty as to duration. Thus, even if the courts award the market
 value of the property, measured as the present value of its expected income stream at tn
 when condemnation is filed, this PVJn will be lower than it would have been in the absence
 of anticipated condemnation. This may be offset by defensive expenditures on "improve-
 ments" that are valued by appraisers and the courts higher than they would have been
 by the market, or by arranging dummy sales at inflated prices to be used in court as
 evidence of market value. Thus, the net effect of anticipation of ED on property value is
 ambiguous a priori. However, since the properties acquired for urban renewal in Chicago
 are predominantly rented, the former negative effect is expected to dominate.
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 hand, presumably adjusts the quality (or implicit hourly wage rate) 14 of
 attorneys and witnesses commensurate with the stakes of the case.
 However, on the other dimension of court expenditure-hours per
 case-it seems likely that the seller faces greater constraints than the
 buyer. Handling any case requires some minimum number of hours of
 appearance in court independent of the value of the property being
 litigated. This number of hours times the implicit hourly wage rate of the
 lowest-quality lawyer represents a minimum fixed cost of going to court
 for the seller. The buyer, on the other hand, may have greater flexibility
 in reducing hours per case because of the possibility of grouping several
 similar parcels in one case. The possibility of spreading the fixed cost of a
 court case over several parcels is available on equal terms to sellers only
 if the costs of negotiating to hire the same lawyer are zero.
 If we ignore for the moment constraints on hours per case, constraints
 on the buyer's choice of quality of lawyer will have the effect of raising
 the buyer's expenditure on low-valued properties and lowering it on
 high-valued properties relative to the seller's expenditure. The effect is
 illustrated for low-valued properties in figure 2.
 Figure 2 represents the costs and returns to hours per case for the buyer
 and seller. The null-hypothesis supply and demand curves, So and Do, are
 drawn on the assumptions that both parties face unconstrained choices,
 that both correctly anticipate the other's behavior and adjust accordingly,
 and that courts are neutral. Both would have identical expenditures,
 WOHO.
 The curves SI and D1 are drawn on the assumption that the buyer is
 constrained to employ above-optimum-quality lawyers at a higher wage
 rate, W1. Assuming the seller's choice of quality unchanged at W0, the
 buyer's lawyers will be relatively more effective, implying an upward
 shift in the buyer's returns-per-hour curve and a downward shift in the
 seller's returns-per-hour curve to D1. Thus, the effect of the constraint is
 to raise buyer expenditure on court influence above that of the seller
 (W1 H1 > WOH1). Given the buyer's constrained choice, it may be
 optimal for the seller to raise quality above W0. But this need not result
 in an equal level of expenditure. If quality levels were equalized at W1,
 the returns curves would shift back to D0o the curves representing returns
 to equal-quality hours. Optimal-hours input would be H.. Thus, the same
 court outcome would be achieved with a more quality intensive input
 mix. But if hours per case are not flexible downward but are constrained
 at some minimum above H, the higher-quality lawyer would require a
 higher fraction of the award, implying a downward shift in the seller's
 demand curve, and reduced expenditure.
 14 Although on the seller's side the form of contract is typically a contingent fee or
 share contract, not a fixed hourly wage contract, the seller can vary the implicit hourly
 wage rate and hours per case indirectly by choice of attorney and by varying the
 attorney's share of the final award.
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 FIG. 2.-Expenditure on court inputs
 Thus, constraints on reduction in quality of legal inputs by the buyer
 and on hours per case for the seller will tend to result in the buyer's
 expenditure on court costs exceeding the seller's on low-valued properties.
 For high-valued properties, the quality ceiling produces the reverse
 effect. The hours constraint is inoperative.
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 A third force tending to produce the same result is the existence of
 economies of scale for the buyer. Court recognition of precedent implies
 an outward shift in the returns-per-hour curve for parcels which are
 sufficiently homogeneous for a precedent effect to operate. In the urban
 renewal sample, homogeneity, and hence the buyer's relative advantage
 due to precedent economies of handling many parcels, is expected to be
 greater on low- than on high-valued parcels. Again, transactions costs are
 assumed to prevent sellers from enjoying these scale economies to the
 same degree.
 These assumptions about the structure of court costs and returns imply:
 Cb > C' on low-valued properties;
 acb ans
 < < 0.
 OPm aPm
 Incorporating into equations (5) and ( 11') yields the alternative
 hypotheses:
 1) PC < Pm on low-valued properties;
 dPc _ -d[hb(Cb)] + d[hs(CN)] + >o0.
 dPm dPm dPm
 Thus, in the absence of any court bias, high-valued parcels will tend to
 receive a higher fraction of market value in court than will low-valued
 parcels.
 2) ?h.dPV dPC 1 (dCb dC.S <O
 dPm dPm 2 KdPm dPm/
 Prices reached voluntarily in out-of-court settlements rise less, relative to
 market value, than do court awards.
 Empirical Evidence
 The empirical estimates of the relationship between ED prices and market
 value are based on land acquisitions by the Chicago Department of Urban
 Renewal for three large projects during the period 1962-70.15 The data
 obtained from HUD consist of final price paid (Ped), assessed value for
 tax purposes ( TA VL), and date of acquisition (DATE) for all parcels. In
 addition, for all parcels in two of the three projects, method of acquisition
 voluntary settlement or court-is known. In order to compare price
 actually paid with market value, an estimate of market value was derived
 for each parcel in the ED sample. The procedure used was to estimate a
 I-' The projects are Southeast Englewood, Near West Side, and Lincoln Park I.
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 TABLE 2
 ED SAMPLE SUBDIVIDED BY ZONE
 (t-STATISTIC IN PARENTHESES)
 A. REGRESSIONS OF Ped B. REGRESSIONS OF Pm
 ZONE C Pm R2/SEE* C Ped R2/SEE*
 R4 ..... -11.2807 2.20652 .6437 6.60185 0.291745 .6437
 n = 202 (-10.4540) (19.0102) (.430314) (46.493) (19.01) (0.15647)
 R5 ..... -2.71576 1.27976 .1476 8.40721 0.115344 .1476
 n = 192 (-1.28492) (5.75121) (.696318) (44.2836) (5.75124) (0.209045)
 C ..... 6.01600 1.64972 .2363 8.20651 0.143216 .2363
 n = 232 (-3.1975) (8.43511) (.70775) (48.909) (8.43517) (2.0853)
 B ..... -9.5534 1.99435 .6003 6.77291 0.301006 .6003
 n = 147 (-7.24648) (14.7574) (.48559) (33.465) (14.757) (0.188652)
 Pmmin Pedmin PMmean Pedmean Pmmax Pedmax
 R4 ..... 6,180 2,920 11,272 9,200 35,260 135,000
 R5 ..... 6,464 4,985 13,619 13,000 22,100 24,200
 C ..... 7,729 6,340 15,449 20,100 28,300 53,700
 B ..... 9,045 5,515 17,951 22,100 38,600 98,800
 NOTE.-Definition of variables:
 predicted ED prices given Pm
 ,m (min) minimum estimated market led(mn) minimum and regression coefficients
 1,m (mean); = mean ' ,alues fronq P^ed (mean) = mean estimated, from regression of
 Pm(max) ) maximum Pm = Xedfl Ped(max) maximum Ped on Pm (first set above)
 * SEE = standard error of estimate.
 relationship between market value, assessed value, and several property
 characteristics from a sample of properties sold on the free market in
 areas of Chicago similar in character to those where urban renewal
 projects have been undertaken.16 The estimating equations used are the
 last four reported in table 1. The coefficients obtained were then applied
 to data on the same explanatory variables to generate an estimate of
 market value, Pm, for all parcels in the ED sample.
 Table 2 reports the results of ordinary least-squares regressions of price
 paid under ED on estimated market value. Since the equation is estimated
 in logarithmic form, the null hypothesis predicts a zero intercept and
 coefficient of unity on pm. The evidence strongly supports the alternative
 16 The market sample consists of property sales in Chicago over the period 1968-72
 in the Community Areas (as defined by the 1960 census) in which some urban renewal
 project has been located. Sample size considerations dictated drawing from a much larger
 area than that covered by the ED sample, which includes only three of the 20 or
 more urban renewal sites. Theoretically, it is appropriate to draw the market sample
 from areas similar in character to the ED sample but not sufficiently close to actual urban
 renewal sites for property values to have been affected, since ED compensation is not
 supposed to reflect value of the property to the buyer. In practice it was found that
 private market sales in the immediate vicinity of urban renewal sites were very sparse, so
 contamination of the market sample by the effects of urban renewal should be minimal.
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 06 Jun 2016 15:27:22 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 488 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
 hypothesis, that low-valued properties receive less than market value and
 high-valued properties receive more than market value.1 7
 To test the plausibility of the results and obtain an idea of the order
 of magnitude involved, the mean, minimum, and maximum Pm were
 calculated for each zoning class and compared with the corresponding
 values implied by the regression equations for ED prices. The exact
 results vary across zones, but the generalization that ED is a tax on
 low-valued and a subsidy on high-valued properties holds for all zones.
 As a rough approximation, a $7,000 parcel receives about $5,000, a
 $13,000 property breaks even, and a $40,000 property may get two or
 three times its market value.
 The regressions in table 3 are designed to investigate which property
 characteristics are associated with deviations of ED price from market
 value (PDIF = Ped - Pm). If deviations of ED prices from market value
 were due solely to factors common to all properties of a particular value,
 the coefficients in the PDIF equations should be insignificantly different
 from zero. The consistently positive coefficients on TA VL are surprising
 if Pm accurately incorporates all of the systematic relation between
 tax-assessed value and market value. A possible explanation is that either
 appraisers or the courts treat assessed value as an indicator of market
 value and fail to recognize that component of actual assessed value which
 is a deviation from the average market assessment ratio and which would
 be capitalized into property value in a free-market sale because of the
 effect on tax liability. This would imply a coefficient closer to unity for
 the ED than for the market sample, which is in fact found.'8 While there
 may be some validity to this explanation, it is insufficient alone to account
 for the evidence on deviations of ED prices from market value. If courts
 17 This estimate is no doubt affected by, but cannot be readily explained away in
 terms of, either random or systematic error in Pm. The purpose of using a predictive
 equation for Pm is to control for any systematic variation across properties in the ratio of
 assessed value to market value, and hence avoid a systematic bias in the estimate of
 market value that would exist if assessed value alone were used as a simple proxy for
 market value. Systematic bias in the predicted Pm may nonetheless exist, since measure-
 ment error in the explanatory variables of the predictive equation will lead to biased
 estimates of the coefficient vector used to predict Pm. The direction of the bias is not
 known, however, in the case of a multivariate ordinary least squares regression with
 errors in more than one independent variable. Assuming that the errors in Pm are additive
 in the logarithmic specification and uncorrelated with either the true values or the
 stochastic disturbance term in the relation between ED price and true market value,
 then a lower bound on the true value of the slope coefficient is given by the estimate
 obtained by regressing Ped on Pm (set A in table 2) and an upper bound by the reciprocal
 of the coefficient obtained by regressing Pm on Ped (set B in table 2). Both exceed unity.
 However, if the assumptions with respect to the error structure in Pm are not met, this
 test does not yield bounds on the true coefficient. In the absence of knowledge of the
 direction of bias in Pm, nothing can be said a priori about the direction of potential bias
 in the estimated relation between ED price and market value.
 18 The total coefficient on TA VL is the sum of the coefficient of the PDIF equations
 (table 3) and that from the market equations (table 1) used in calculating Pm.
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 were guided solely by assessed value, there would be no reason for sellers
 to engage lawyers and appraisers to defend them in court. Moreover, the
 adherence-to-assessed-value hypothesis cannot account for the divergence
 between the pattern of court awards and settlement prices in relation to
 market value predicted by the court-costs theory and confirmed by the
 evidence discussed below.
 Other variables of interest are TEN, the number of tenants with listed
 phones, and DATE, the date of acquisition, measured in months from
 earliest observation in each location.
 In the market sample, TEN, the number of tenants with listed phones,
 is expected to measure a combination of tenant capacity and current
 occupancy. If tenant capacity and potential income vary among structures
 to an extent not fully captured in assessed value, the positive coefficients
 observed in the predictive equation for the two residential zones are to
 be expected. The significant positive coefficients on TEN in three of the
 four PDIF equations then suggest that high capacity or occupancy rates
 have a greater impact on ED awards than on free-market prices. If it is
 the case that anticipation of ED reduces occupancy rates due to
 uncertainty of lease duration and compensability of improvement and
 maintenance expenditure and that this is reflected in lower ED awards,
 then ED creates an incentive for the buyer to delay acquisition or hold
 out to depress prices analogous to the seller's supposed incentive to hold
 out in the free market.' 9
 However, if the effect of ED, whether intended or not, is to reduce
 occupancy rates below normal, then the observed number of tenants will
 measure with error the potential rental capacity of properties in the ED
 sample. Then the positive effect of rental capacity on market value will
 be biased down in the estimates of market value. If courts respond to
 potential rather than actual occupancy, a positive coefficient on TEN in
 19 Residential buildings are predominantly tenant occupied in urban renewal areas
 of Chicago, with average period of occupancy 1-3 years. Anticipation of the effect of ED
 by sellers presumably includes awareness that high vacancy rates may depress ED prices.
 This would create an incentive to maintain occupancy rates by lowering rental charges.
 The extent to which such defensive behavior by sellers is a good investment depends on
 the relative magnitudes of the price elasticity of demand for leases, the reduction in
 demand for leases due to uncertainty as to duration, and the elasticity of ED prices with
 respect to number of tenants and rental rates. An upper bound on the estimated effect
 on ED price of an increase by one in the number of tenants lies between 5 and 10 percent.
 As a rough calculation, at the point of means for the court sample (table 5), an increase
 in the number of listed tenants from one to two would raise ED price by $600-$1,200.
 For any individual landlord, the demand for leases is likely to be inelastic, since he cannot
 assume other landlords will maintain higher rentals as he reduces his if anticipation of
 ED is widespread in the neighborhood. The less elastic the demand curve, the greater the
 reduction in rental rates required to increase the number of tenants, and the greater the
 loss in rental income over the interim between anticipation of ED and filing the petition
 to condemn. Thus, stocking up with tenants in anticipation of ED is only likely to be
 profitable if the demand curve is elastic, or, if inelastic, where the expected delay is short,
 so that loss of rental income is less than expected gain in ED price.
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 the PDIF equations may be expected. Given this potential for errors-in-
 variables bias if the effect to be measured in fact exists, it seems, in
 principle, not possible to measure the holdout incentives of buyers to
 depress occupancy and hence prices under ED in the absence of better
 data on potential rental capacity.
 The coefficients on the DA TE variable only support the weak conclusion
 that there is no evidence that ED holds down the rise in prices over the
 duration of the assembly. The coefficients must be interpreted as the
 difference between the monthly rate of inflation in the market and ED
 samples, since the former was incorporated into Pm (except in R5, since
 for this zone DATE was insignificant in the market sample). But the
 market rate of increase of property values differs across the city at any
 point in time and over time. The average market rate of inflation was
 probably less in the early 1960s, from which roughly half the ED sample
 was drawn, than in 1968-72, from which the market data were drawn.
 Therefore, ignoring interarea differences, the null hypothesis that ED
 prices follow the same pattern over time as the market would imply a
 negative coefficient on DA TE in the equations for PDIF. The size should
 be the difference between the monthly market rate of inflation in 1968-72
 and 1962-65 weighted by the proportion of the ED sample drawn from
 the earlier period. Taking 5 percent and 2.5 percent as the average annual
 rates for the two periods, weighting the difference by 0.5 yields a rough
 estimate for the expected coefficient on DA TE of -0.001. Of the estimated
 coefficients, two exceed and two fall short of this benchmark for the null
 hypothesis. To the extent prices under an assembly in the free market
 would rise faster over time than the market average due to the holdout
 problem, the conclusions are more favorable for ED.
 The second proposition to be tested is that prices are the same fraction
 of market value for parcels settling in and out of court, against the
 alternative that high-valued parcels receive a higher price (gross of court
 costs) relative to market value in court awards than in voluntary settle-
 ments, because court costs or expenditures fall, relative to parcel value,
 more for buyers than for sellers.20
 The Southeast Englewood and Near West Side samples, for which there
 are data on method of settlement, were pooled and divided into subsets
 according to whether the price was awarded in court or agreed on in
 20 It may be shown that the predictions of the alternative hypothesis of the model of
 price determination,
 d (PcIPj) > 0 and d (Pv/Pm) _ d(PcPm) < 0
 dPm dPm dPm
 imply
 d ln P >1 and d ln P, < d ln PC
 dlnPm dlnPm dlnPm'
 which is the form in which the theory was tested.
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 voluntary negotiations. The results are reported in table 4. The regressions
 were run in both directions to estimate bounds on the true coefficient, on
 the assumption of additive measurement errors in both variables when
 the equation is estimated in logarithmic form.
 Comparing equations (2) and (3) in table 4 in the regressions of Ped
 on Pm) we find that the intercept is lower and the coefficient on Pm higher
 in the court set than in the voluntary set. The difference is statistically
 significant by a Chow test. This evidence tends to refute the null hypothesis
 and support the alternative of greater regressivity in court. A similar
 conclusion is implied by the regressions of Pm on Ped. However, if these
 two sets of estimates are treated as bounds on the true coefficients, the
 ranges overlap:
 2.645 < Pf < 4.87; 1.475 < P, < 3.81,
 where fC is the coefficient on Pm in the court set and f,3 is the coefficient
 in the voluntary set. The hypothesis that the true values are equal can
 therefore not be firmly rejected.
 Table 4 also reports estimates of the same equations with the sample
 subdivided into low- and high-valued parcels, the division being made at
 $12,000, which is close to the mean for both court and voluntary sets. The
 purpose is to test the possibility that the true relation is nonlinear and
 that differences in the estimated coefficients for the court and voluntary
 sets are attributable to different frequency distributions of parcel values
 for the two sets. The evidence does not support this conclusion.
 Two indirect tests of the reasonableness of the model of price deter-
 mination may be performed with these estimates. First, cost minimization
 for the buyer requires that P, < E(P,)b + Cb. Both E(PC)b and Cb are
 unknown. However, an estimate of the lower bound on E(P,)b is given
 by Pc, observed court award for a property of equal market value. It is a
 lower bound because the voluntary set will not be a random drawing from
 the distribution of parcels but will tend to "select" those parcels on which
 the buyer overestimated the court award and thus offered a high price
 relative to the seller's minimum ask (assuming errors in buyer and
 seller expectations are not positively correlated). Then cost minimization
 requires that
 P- PC < E(PC)b - PC + Cb;
 that is, the difference between the regression estimates of settlement price
 and court award for a property of a given market value is a lower bound
 on the sum of the buyer's error in predicting court award and his court
 costs. At the sample mean of $12,000, P,, - PC = $3,000, which seems
 not unreasonable.
 The second test utilizes the assumption that prices reached in voluntary
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 TABLE 5
 SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES FOR COURT AND VOLUNTARY SETS
 Court Voluntary
 Antilog Antilog
 Variable Mean Mean Variance Mean Mean Variance
 Ped*....... 9.15617 $9,475 1.00027 9.57907 14,450 0.404433
 TAVL* .... 8.16021 3,495 0.988743 8.34385 4,250 0.590253
 Pm* ....... 9.35127 11,550 0.080279 9.38721 11,950 0.070708
 DA TE ..... 9.64748 ... 18.3893 7.9629 ... 26.5488
 DC ........ 0.10791 ... 0.09696 0.07407 ... 0.068842
 TEN ...... 1.07914 ... 1.986 1.8444 ... 3.90136
 VAL ....... 75.1439 ... 883.312 71.8333 ... 634.080
 * Arithmetic mean of logs = geometric mean of absolute numbers:
 Arithmetic Mean Variance Arithmetic Mean Variance
 Ped .15,199.6 0.335801 17,881.7 0.192506
A E09 E 9
 Pm .11,980.6 0.118874 12.385.8 0.134233
 E08 E08
 settlements are the average of minimum offer and maximum ask, which
 reduces to
 PV = PC + j(Cb - Cs).
 Three thousand dollars, the difference between settlement price and
 court award for a mean-valued property, seems excessive as an estimate
 of half the difference in court costs. However, again the model may be
 salvaged by selectivity bias considerations.
 The voluntary set will comprise two groups of parcels, A and B, on
 which the buyer overestimated and the seller underestimated, respectively,
 Pcv, the hypothetical court award on a parcel which settled out of court.
 Assuming uncorrelated errors, for set A
 PV = Pcv + .(Cb - Cs) + i[E(PCv)b -pcv] > PV,
 and for set B
 PV = PCv + i(Cb - CS) - j[PCV - E(PcY)] < Pv)
 where
 PV = PC, + _(Cb - Cs).
 Thus, observed Pv is an unbiased proxy for Pv only if A and B are equal-
 sized samples from the same population and if average buyer and seller
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 errors are equal in absolute value. If the buyer makes larger or more
 frequent errors, set A will dominate and observed P, > Ps, so that
 P- P > 1 (Cb - Cs).
 The question arises whether observed Pc is an unbiased proxy for PC .
 By a similar argument, the court set will comprise two groups of parcels,
 with negative errors in buyer expectations of PC,, and therefore low offers
 relative to PV, and positive errors in seller expectations, and therefore
 relatively high asks. However, even if negative buyer errors dominate in
 frequency or mean absolute magnitude, actual court awards are still
 unbiased for PC, if the courts are unaffected by the asks and offers of
 pretrial negotiations. This assumption is plausible if it is cheap for sellers
 to match low offers by symmetrically high asks in court in excess of asks
 in pretrial negotiations. This is implicit in equation (5), which makes
 court award only a fraction of market value and expenditure on court
 inputs.
 Conclusions
 This study of urban renewal in Chicago suggests that ED does not ensure
 that fair market value is paid in an assembly. The mean ratio of price
 to market value is 1.27 for the court sample and 1.45 for the voluntary
 sample, with a weighted average of 1.388. This does not necessarily imply
 a suboptimal amount of assembly, since the opportunity cost of land for
 an assembly is expected to exceed mean market value. However, it seems
 unlikely that the pattern of reservation prices corresponds to the pattern
 of ED prices. Under ED, high-valued parcels systematically receive more
 than market value and low-valued parcels receive less than market value.
 This is consistent with a simple model of how prices would be determined
 assuming optimizing behavior within the constraints imposed by ED and
 a structure of court costs which induces higher buyer expenditure relative
 to the seller's on low-valued properties, but the opposite relation on
 high-valued properties. Obviously, the structure of court costs may vary
 in different contexts, so the conclusion with respect to the pattern of ED
 prices is only generalizable in similar contexts.
 The full-cost calculus of the relative efficiency of ED and the free
 market in handling assemblies cannot be made without data on com-
 parable market assemblies and on transactions costs, including labor
 inputs and forgone income on land due to delay in transferring it to a
 higher-valued use. Both components of transactions costs are likely to be
 higher under ED. Thus, both theoretical considerations and the evidence
 available leave unproved the case for the superior efficiency of ED.
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 Appendix
 TABLE Al
 GLOSSARY
 Variable Definition Source
 PRL ....... Price of property in sample of Transfer tax stamps reported in
 random market sales; natural Real Estate News
 logarithm
 Ped ........ Price of property in ED sample; Unpublished HUD records
 natural logarithm
 TA VL ...... Assessed value of land plus Cook County property tax roles:
 assessed value of improvements; 1969-70, market sample; 1965,
 natural logarithm Lincoln Park ED sample.
 Unpublished HUD records:
 Southeast Englewood and
 Near West Side samples (date
 of assessment unknown)
 VALL ...... Value per foot of frontage; Olcott's Land Values (year prior
 natural logarithm to the year of the first observa-
 tion for the market and for
 each ED sample)
 Z ........ Zoning category Olcott's Land Values (year as for
 VALL)
 TEN ....... Number of tenants with listed Donnelley's Street Address Directory
 phones (year as for VALL)
 DC ........ Commercial use dummy; 0 = no Donnelley's Street Address Directory
 commercial use; 1 = commercial
 use
 DCT ....... DC x TAVL ...
 DA TE ..... Number of months from month As for PRL and Ped
 of first observation in each sample
 DZ ........ Zoning dummy; 0 = more re- As for Z
 strictive zone; 1 = less restric-
 tive zone
 DZT ....... DZ x TAVL ...
 Pm ........ Predicted market value of pro- ...
 perties in ED sample; natural
 logarithm
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